Jenny Zhang
Affiliation: University of Edinburgh
Category: Philosophy
Date: Friday 5th of September
Time: 16:00
Location: Room 154 (154)
View the full session: Morality & Social Cognition
Some experimental paradigms in empirical moral psychology study utilitarian thinking (Conway & Gawronski, 2013; Conway et al., 2018; Everett & Kahane, 2020; Greene, 2007, 2013, 2014; Greene et al., 2001; Greene et al., 2004). The underlying assumption is that utilitarianism is a system of ethical thinking that individuals – including both philosophers and non-philosophers – can and do employ in moral decision-making. Thus, empirical studies on utilitarianism yield valuable findings about moral decision-making.
While the effectiveness of using certain paradigms, e.g., utilising sacrificial dilemmas as stimulus materials, has been called into question, the background assumption that utilitarian thinking is an ecologically valid system of ethical thinking, which can be operationalised and studied empirically, has not yet been examined. The aim of my paper is to question this assumption by elucidating some issues with the general experimental approach of studying utilitarianism. This provides valuable lessons for re-examining and re-defining the scope of empirical research that studies theoretical constructs adopted from normative ethics and moral philosophy more broadly.
To this end, I highlight two sets of issues. The first set of issues concerns moral psychological studies that draw explicit connections between sacrificial dilemmas and normative ethical theories, such as utilitarianism. I argue that this approach reflects an implicit assumption of fit with theory – the assumption that sacrificial dilemmas reliably track attitudes towards, or inclinations about, normative ethical theories, such as utilitarianism. With consideration of existing empirical evidence (Kahane, 2015; Kahane et al., 2015) and trolley problems’ initial purposes (Foot, 1967; Thomson, 1976), I observe that trolley problems – and thus, the sacrificial dilemmas that emulate them – are not designed for the purpose of eliciting responses that reflect utilitarianism or deontology. Thus, I maintain that there are both empirical and theoretical grounds to question the said assumption. This casts doubt on findings that allegedly shed light on utilitarian thinking, where sacrificial dilemmas are used as stimuli.
To address the issues stemming from the assumption of fit, a promising proposal is to develop new experimental paradigms, which do not use sacrificial dilemmas as stimulus materials. I argue that a second set of issues arises when (a) the proposed paradigm involves studying a theoretical construct that is not unique to utilitarianism, (b) a broad category is instrumentalised by identifying, constructing and measuring subcategories, proxy variables or correlates, the exact relations among which remain ambiguous, or (c) the target construct comprises a normative ideal.
I illustrate this second set of issues by examining a recent proposal of studying impartial beneficence as a psychological dimension for utilitarianism, in a multidimensional approach (Everett & Kahane, 2020). More specifically, I argue that firstly, various other ethical theories appeal to impartial beneficence, so impartial beneficence does not distinctively characterise utilitarianism. While I acknowledge that studying it has the potential to elucidate some common features prescribed by ethical theories at large, I maintain that studying impartial beneficence does not tell us anything particular about, or unique to, utilitarian thinking.
Secondly, it can be questioned the extent to which experimental findings from studying plausible correlates of impartial beneficence are illuminating. By “illuminating”, I refer to the extent to which these correlational subcategories map onto the target feature, and the explanatory potential that findings about these subcategories have, for elucidating what it means to exhibit impartial beneficence as a utilitarian agent in a moral situation. It is, for example, unclear what findings about empathetic concern and its underlying psychological processes actually tell us about impartial beneficence and utilitarian thinking.
Thirdly, given that impartial beneficence is a normative ideal, which does not straightforwardly correspond to day-to-day moral behaviour, studying impartial beneficence involves operationalising a prescriptive recommendation by identifying, constructing and measuring some descriptive subcategories. Findings about the descriptive subcategories, correlates and/or proxies may only tell us something about approximating the normative ideal, instead of providing insights about the relevant features and processes when one psychologically and behaviourally embodies the ideal of impartial beneficence.
The general recommendation is to not only move beyond the experimental paradigm of using sacrificial dilemmas as stimulus materials, but also be cautious when designing empirical studies around utilitarianism and interpreting results from those studies. To avoid the abovementioned issues, researchers can narrow the scope of their inquiries by focusing on operationalisable subcategories alone. That is, operationalisable (sub)categories can be measured and studied, without presuming that they constitute proxies or correlates for a broad category (such as utilitarianism) or a normative ideal (such as impartial beneficence). The findings will still be valuable, insofar as they shed light on features relevant to moral thinking and behaviour, e.g., empathetic concern, egoism or altruism. It is plausible that utilitarianism, as a systematising normative ethical theory, is not an ecologically valid system of ethical thinking that can be readily operationalised and suitably studied in experimental conditions.