James Grayot
Affiliation: University of Porto, Institute of Philosophy
Category: Philosophy
Keywords: Framing, Frame-sensitive reasoning, Decision making, Preference formation, Practical reasoning, Ecological rationality, Ecological psychology
Date: Friday 5th of September
Time: 16:00
Location: Room 232 (232)
View the full session: Deliberation
In Frame it Again (FIA), J.L. BermĂșdez (2020) delivers a long-overdue analysis of the concept of framing, expertly covering the philosophical and scientific implications that the phenomenon has posed for the study of human reasoning, judgment, and decision-making. BermĂșdezâs goal is clear from the outset: itâs to clarify what is really involved in framing and to investigate whether there are benefits to being a âframe-sensitive reasonerâ such that even contentious cases of framing might be reconciled with certain mainstream conceptions of rationality. His defense of frame-sensitive reasoning runs roughly as follows:
In contrast to classical perspectives about rationality derived from the axioms of rational choice theory in which decision-makers are viewed as utility maximizers with consistently ordered preferences, we know that individuals are highly sensitive to how decisions are presented to them and that it is not uncommon for them to knowingly hold inconsistent preferences over their options and/or outcomes. Unlike cyclical preferences, which are paradigmatic of irrationality in the classical perspective, âquasi-cyclicalâ preferences are those in which the decision-maker would not change or alter their preference orderings upon learning that two options/outcomes share the same extension, i.e., contain the same properties or attributes. More specifically, quasi-cyclical preferences are deemed not irrational if they are informed by an agentâs taking an âultraintensionalâ perspective toward their options. Ultraintensionality is the representational context in which agents frame their options, placing particular emphasis or focus on some properties/attributes over others. By adopting an ultraintensional perspective towards their options, an individual may behave as though they have cyclical preferences when, in fact, the true values they associate with each option under framing would reveal their preferences to be non-cyclical.
Building upon the non-irrationality of quasi-cyclical preferences, BermĂșdez also argues that there are many contexts in which one ought to be a frame-sensitive reasoner. In scenarios of great social or political complexity, where there is no unitary or âobjectiveâ point of reference to establish a framing of a dilemma or debate, one should strive to consider as many (relevant) frames as possible before settling on a choice. The more flexible and openminded one is in considering different frames, the more likely one will be to reveal underlying emotions or opinions that may bias (positively or negatively) their judgments toward a decision, and thereby, to conscientiously compare and contrast the relevant features of the competing perspectives or viewpoints at issue. This is especially pertinent in cases of interpersonal decision-making, where a collective decision may become âdeadlockedâ due to irreconcilable values over some controversy.
While this paper is sympathetic toward the view that frame-sensitive reasoning can be a reliable path toward rational decision-making, it remains skeptical about some of its theoretical underpinnings and justifications. In short, this paper asks: Why be a frame-sensitive reasoner? âspecifically, what justifies a given framing toward a decision? Starting from the assumption that BermĂșdez is primarily interested in the normative virtues of framing, FIA can be seen as having two overlapping goals: the first is to make the case that quasi-cyclical preferences are at least not irrational; the second is to defend the prudence of frame-sensitive decision-making. While these goals are clearly connected, they each require some unpacking.
Establishing the first goal depends on demonstrating that quasi-cyclical preferences are indeed not irrational. Following BermĂșdez, I take it to be a relatively straightforward matter whether quasi-cyclical preferences, as ultraintensionally-formed preferences, are not irrational. By contrast, and more importantly for this paper, establishing the second goal depends on demonstrating that ultraintensional preference formation is more than merely not irrational, but that its prudence is encapsulated by a form of procedural rationality that is amenable to both microeconomic and decision-theoretic modeling as well as to the demands of practical reasoning in a complex world. For this reason, a robust justification of ultraintensional preference formation must begin with an investigation into (i) the epistemic foundations of ultraintensionality as a representational context, and (ii) the cognitive requirements of decision-makers as epistemic agents. The focus of this paper is about how that investigation should proceed, and in how far we can get toward a theory of frame-sensitive reasoning as procedurally rational without committing question-begging appeals to extant theories of rationality. I do this by couching ultraintensional preference formation in two broader extra-normative schools of thought. The first approach is that of naturalized rationality, specifically ecological and embodied approaches to rationality. The second approach is that of virtue epistemology, specifically the line of virtue epistemology that treats understanding as necessary for, if not more intellectually rigorous than, mere knowledge.
I will argue that the virtue epistemic approach provides a promising avenue toward an extra-normative justification for ultraintensional preference formation by promoting the role of understanding in frame-based decision-making. Yet, I also show how this move opens the theory up to concerns that go beyond what is considered in FIA; in particular, it puts pressure on the theory to identify and commit to cognitive requirements for agents to have understanding. This turns out to be a difficult task given that what counts as understanding will likely differ across decision contexts, and this will obfuscate our search for what is cognitively required for agents to have understanding in each context. This leads to what I will call the âmeta-framingâ problem: Whether or not a theory of frame-sensitive reasoning can be seen as procedurally rational is itself subject to framing what constitutes understanding across decision contexts. So, while both approaches provide potential extra-normative support for ultraintensional preference formation, neither approach on its own is singularly equipped to provide absolute justification. Rather, each approach seems to hint at gaps left unaddressed by the other. This dynamic, though it brings us closer to appreciating what a general theory of frame-sensitive reasoning needs to provide to satisfy BermĂșdezâs second goal, the âmeta-framingâ problem hints at more fundamental challenges to the study of human rationality.
References:
BermĂșdez, J. L. (2020). Frame it again: New tools for rational decision-making. Cambridge University Press.