Paweł Grad
Affiliation: Jagiellonian University
Category: Philosophy
Keywords: perceptual experience, presentational phenomenology, representationalism, phenomenal intentionality, adverbialism
Date: Wednesday 3rd of September
Time: 15:30
Location: Room 161 (161)
View the full session: Perceptual Contents
In this paper, I would like to overview some of the current work of representational content of perceptual experience by examining how well they deal with the following phenomenological datum.
Phenomenal Presentation: In the paradigmatic cases of perceptual experience ε, subject S instantiates the cluster of phenomenal properties Φ (phenomenal character) such that, from S's perspective, the most straightforward description of ε is that Φ presents him with perceived mind-independent particulars (objects and their property instances).
To appreciate the plausibility of Phenomenal presentation as a phenomenological datum, we must remember that its not a thesis about metaphysical nature of perceptual experience, nor does it settle the question about experience’s inherently representational properties. It is what it is: plausible claim about how perceptual experience, in the paradigmatic cases thereof, strikes human subjects like us. Given the role of how experience strike us in grounding our phenomenal concepts (Chalmers 2010, Ch. 10), however, this phenomenological datum has important theoretical consequences by restricting plausibility of some theories of experiential representation. By overviewing the current philosophical literature on representational content of perceptual experience in the light of Phenomenal presentation thesis I would like to test these theories. The general idea behind this test is that if a given theory suggests that subjective description of Φ as specified by Phenomenal presentation is essentially erroneous, then this fact speaks against given theory. The theories that I would like to examine include selected forms of contingent (adverbialism (D'Ambrosio 2019) and qualitative view (Papineau 2021) and essential representationalism (naturalistic representationalism (Dretske 1993, 1995, 2003; Lycan 1996; Tye 2000; Speaks 2015; Schellenberg 2018), and phenomenal intentionalism (Loar 2003; Horgan & Tienson 2002; Kriegel 2011, 2013; Mendelovici 2018; Burget 2019; Ashby 2020 Banick 2021; White forthcoming). Adverbialism is a view according to which phenomenal properties are purely non-relational properties of the subject and offers anerror theory to explain away plausibility of Phenomenal presentation. According to adverbialism, the fact that phenomenal character is best characterizable in terms of apparently presented objects, amounts only to adverbial metaphysics of my phenomenal consciousness as being modified reddish and squarish, for instance, when I am apparently presented with something red and square in my physical environment. However, strictly speaking, there is nothing about my phenomenal consciousness that makes it essentially relational with respect to my environment. Phenomenology, thus, is at best contingently representational. Qualitative view is very similar by taking phenomenal properties to be internal, presumably physical, monadic properties of the subject, however it put much more stress on facts about causal history between my perceptual system and environment in order to explain contingently representational function of perceptual experience Naturalistic representationalism aims to explain phenomenal character in terms of perceptual system operating with certain sort of representational contents that are stand-ins of mind-independent objects and properties that causes relevant physical states in the neuralsystem. Phenomenal intentionalism reverses the order of explanation, and attempts to explain representational content in terms of phenomenal character. Both naturalistic representationalism and phenomenal intentionalism establish an essential relation between phenomenology and representational content, however it might be argued that they work with two concepts of representation (one grounded in our grasp of computational systems other grasp on our introspection-based self-understanding as conscious beings). The hypothesis to be tested is that neither contingent representationalism nor naturalistic representationalism are compatible with Phenomenal presentation. The first implies that our introspection-based self-understanding is systematically misleading. The second is unable to explain the direct character of perceptual presentation. Phenomenal intentionalism fares much better, however it should be extended beyond the standard phenomenal account of representational content in terms of primitive intentional relation (subjective character), qualitative profile, and structural organisation. I speculate that cognitive embedding of phenomenal character (the way in which experience interacts with other mental states) also is constitutive for some genuinely phenomenal aspects of perception and grounds representational content of experience. The paper is structured as follows: after introduction (§1), I unpack the Phenomenal presentation thesis (§2). Sections §§3-5 test relevant theories of experiential representation for how well they deal with Phenomenal presentation. §6 suggest a possible extension of phenomenal intentionality programme. §7 concludes.
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