Rebecca Dreier
Affiliation: London School of Economics and Political Science
Category: Philosophy
Keywords: episodic-like memory, consciousness, animal minds, episodic memory
Date: Wednesday 3rd of September
Time: 17:30
Location: Room 154 (154)
View the full session: Temporal Consciousness
While some have argued that nonhuman animals have no episodic memory at all (Hoerl and McCormack 2019; Suddendorf, Redshaw, and Bulley 2022), others ascribe episodic-like memory to various animals (Clayton et al. 2001; Clayton and Dickinson 1998; Martin-Ordas et al. 2010; Schnell et al. 2021). Episodic memory can be described as the capacity to recall specific, past events. In humans’ episodic memory is conscious. This means that we have a phenomenologically conscious mental representation of a particular past event. Animals’ episodic-like memory is said to lack various features human episodic memory has (Clayton et al. 2001). “Phenomenological sceptics” hold that the evidence shows that animals recall “what, where and when” something happened, but does not show that they consciously experience this recall - indeed, they hold that it is impossible to find out whether they do (Brown and Boyle 2024). This suggests it is possible that, upon remembering, animals do not form a conscious mental representation. I argue against the phenomenological sceptic in this paper, considering various reasons to be less sceptical. This would mean that the what-where-when memory found in nonhuman animals is not just like episodic memory but is episodic memory. It is a consciously experienced recall of a particular past event.
Even though nonhuman animals are said to lack a conscious mental representation of the past, they can use their recall similarly to how humans use their episodic memory. The earliest tests of episodic-like memory in scrub jays showed that they use their what-where-when memories to make rational decisions about which caches to retrieve without representing a conscious episodic memory (Clayton and Dickinson 1998). But evidence of episodic-like memory has grown to be extensive and covers various nonhuman animals. For example, Jozet-Alves, Bertin, and Clayton (2013) consider evidence for episodic-like memory in cuttlefish who match their foraging behaviour to remembered facts, such as what, where and when they have eaten. They argue that this style of foraging exhibited by cuttlefish qualifies as episodic-like memory (Jozet-Alves et al. 2013). Various species of mammals are also covered in research of episodic-like memory, piling up to a large body of evidence suggesting that various animals possess episodic-like memory and can make flexible use of it in various circumstances (Fugazza et al. 2020; Kouwenberg et al. 2009; Martin-Ordas et al. 2010).
In this paper, I challenge the claim that nonhuman animals only have episodic-like memory. Instead, I consider various reasons suggesting that at least some nonhuman animals experience their episodic memories consciously. If nonhuman animals have a phenomenally conscious experience of their past, this has significant moral implications. For example, following Mahr and Fischer (2023) one might argue that episodic memories, if consciously experienced, act as a multiplier of bad or good past experiences. This would make these (positive or negative) experiences, especially when harm is inflicted, even more morally significant.
When considering whether animals consciously experience their memories, I argue that they at least potentially can have valenced experience of their episodic memory. This would mean that when an animal recalls an experience, they consciously represent the past. Depending on whether the past experience was positive or negative, the recall will likewise be experienced as either positive or negative. I propose two arguments for this claim. First, I argue that some evidence used to attribute episodic-like memory might also be used as an indicator for conscious recall. Secondly, I propose a conceptual argument. I consider in how far episodic memory can be understood as a state that is necessarily consciously experienced. Whether a past representation is consciously experienced would be a factor to individuate episodic memory. Therefore, if animals are found to lack this conscious experience their recall cannot qualify as episodic. They have episodic memory, or they miss it completely.
First, there are various reasons why current evidence for episodic-like memory might already be sufficient for showing episodic memory. For example, Eichenbaum et al. (2005) argue that the combination of evidence on various aspects of episodic memory, is evidence of the same episodic recall processes as we find in humans. Making use of this strategy might enable us to reevaluate evidence of what, where, when memories in some nonhuman animals, through combining it with evidence of brain activation as we see it in humans (Eichenbaum et al. 2005). Furthermore, we might reanalyse some specific studies instead of merely combining their findings. Boyle (2020) argues that various phenomenological features of episodic memory, can be said to be impure. That is, besides giving us a phenomenological feeling, they also have a functional role, because the phenomenological feature “does something for us” (Boyle 2020:647). I consider in how far the studies of episodic-like memory in nonhuman animals provide us with evidence of impure phenomenological features. This in turn would be evidence that nonhuman animals consciously experience their recall of the past.
Second, I consider a conceptual argument which asks what the nature of episodic memory is. If we accept that episodic memory is an evolved capacity (and not merely a functional by-product like Schulz and Robins (2023) argue), then it evolved to have various functions. There is a question in how far we can expect functional variations between different species, based on their individual evolutionary histories (Brown and Boyle 2024). However, some ways of using episodic memory might be a clear indicator of a functionally similar episodic memory. Besides this functional individuation, I propose that episodic memory should be individuated by conscious experience: only conscious recall of a particular past event constitutes episodic memory. This means that whenever we find evidence of a recall that functions similarly to our episodic memory, we have evidence for conscious episodic memory in that nonhuman animal.
Thus, by considering evidence of episodic-like memory I argue that we should attribute episodic memory to at least some nonhuman animals for which we have evidence of various aspects of episodic-like memory, of impure phenomenological features, or of functional similarities.