Michał Barcz
Affiliation: University of Warsaw
Category: Philosophy
Keywords: slips, slip-ups, intentional action, habitual action, agency, intention, action theory, causal theory of action
Date: Tuesday 2nd of September
Time: 17:30
Location: Maria Skłodowska-Curie Hall (123)
View the full session: Agency
According to the dominant philosophical view on agency, an action must be intentional under some description. Following the standard interpretation of this thesis, supported by proponents of the causal theory of action, an action is intentional only when described in terms of its mental cause, such as the agent’s intention or reasons. In my presentation, I show that slips may be considered actions, however, they are unintentional under any description. I contend that although prototypical actions are indeed intentional, the causalistic account of agency appears too narrow.
I begin with a brief introduction to the concept of a slip. Then, I present and discuss a selection of representative contemporary attempts to determine the intentional description of slip-ups proposed by Santiago Amaya; these attempts turn out to be unsatisfactory. Next, I discuss the conditions of agency under which slips are actions. I conclude with a dilemma: either, contrary to important philosophical intuitions, slips are non-actions; or some actions unintentional under any description.
Imagine a man going to his room to change clothes for dinner, and let us juxtapose two scenarios. In the first scenario, the man returns in ten minutes, dressed in a tie and jacket. In the second scenario, he ends up in his bed, dressed in his pajamas. The first case represents a regular and uncontroversial intentional action, and the second – a classic example recorded by James (1890) – illustrates a paradigmatic case of a slip-up. I argue that while both behaviors should be considered actions, only the former is intentional under some description.
The man’s dressing up in his pajamas and heading to bed was unintentional when described in terms of his intentions. But does his behavior still count as an intentional action? Is it intentional under some other description? Following Santiago Amaya’s recent publications (Amaya 2013, 2021), it has become philosophical common sense that these questions can be answered affirmatively. Both papers develop a similar idea: slips are intentional under the description of the incorrect implementation of the agent’s intention. I will discuss the author’s proposals in turn.
Amaya’s earlier theory (Amaya 2013) argues that slips are intentional in terms of the agent’s intentions of a specific, technical type—namely, implementation intentions. In the case of regular intentional action, these intentions implement the agent’s goals (goal intentions). When one slips, some implementation intentions happen to be out of line with her goals. Recently (Amaya 2021), the author proposed an account based on an important insight into the nature of slips: they occur out of habit. According to this theory, slips are intentional in terms of the agent’s wrongly implemented intention and a working habit.
Amaya’s proposals have not received a critical review. I provide one in my presentation and argue that Amaya’s attempts to justify the intentional character of slip-ups are unconvincing. In a nutshell, the intentions and habits mentioned by the author, even if they guide an erroneous action, cannot provide its intentional description. Therefore, slips are unintentional under any description.
Beneath the discussion of the intentional description of slips lurks the question of the nature and criteria of agency. I argue that slip-ups may be considered actions, but only on the basis of alternative criteria of agency—criteria that do not presuppose the presence of intentions, reasons, or goals. The Frankfurtian idea of agent-control (or agent-intervention) (Frankfurt 1978) and the idea of responsibility represent some interesting options in this context.
If one agrees that there are unintentional actions, one does not necessarily have to deny that intentional actions are central to our understanding of agency; they are not the only actions, though. From this perspective, slips represent a more peripheral form of agency. Yet, my aim here is not to deliver decisive arguments. Rather, I would like to present action theorists with an announced dilemma: either, contrary to important philosophical intuitions, slips are non-actions; or some actions are unintentional under any description.
References: Amaya, S. (2013) Slips, Noûs 47 (3), pp. 559-576. Amaya, S. (2020). Out of habit, Synthese 198 (12): pp. 11161-11185. Frankfurt, H. (1978). The Problem of Action, American Philosophical Quarterly, 15 (2), pp. 157-162. James, W. (1890). The principles of psychology. New York: Holt.