Marko Jurjako
Affiliation: University of Rijeka
Category: Philosophy
Date: Tuesday 2nd of September
Time: 18:00
Location: Room 154 (154)
View the full session: Functional Analysis & Mechanisms
The interface problem in the philosophy of psychology concerns how to understand the relationship between personal (including folk-psychological) and subpersonal explanations (BermĂşdez, 2005; Drayson, 2024). Traditionally, this problem has been approached through a monist lens, assuming that a single solution should apply uniformly across different domains of inquiry. In this paper, I argue that monism generates unnecessary theoretical tensions, and advocate for a pluralist approach that allows for different solutions to the interface problem depending on the domain in question.
To frame the discussion, I begin with José Bermúdez’s (2005) influential formulation of the interface problem, which outlines three major positions: autonomism, which treats personal and subpersonal explanations as independent; functionalism, which emphasizes continuity and potential reduction between the two levels; and co-evolutionism, which posits mutual influence between them. Traditionally, debates about the interface problem assume that one of these positions must be correct across all domains (e.g. Sifferd 2018). I challenge this monist assumption and propose an inter-domain pluralism, which accommodates the possibility that different domains require different solutions to the interface problem.
Using autonomism as a reference point, I illustrate the advantages of pluralism by examining how the interface problem plays out in cognitive science and criminal law.
I argue that in cognitive science autonomism is largely untenable because many contemporary cognitive models, such as Bayesian and predictive processing accounts, incorporate intentionalist descriptions at both personal and subpersonal levels (Shea, 2018; Drayson 2024). Moreover, the strict separation assumed by autonomism does not align with how cognitive scientists integrate personal-level mental states (e.g., beliefs, intentions) with subpersonal computational and mechanistic explanations (Drayson, 2012). In this domain, a functionalist or co-evolutionary approach better accommodates current scientific practice, as it allows for interaction between levels of explanation.
However, in criminal law, autonomism seems more appropriate. Core legal doctrines—particularly those concerning criminal responsibility—are built on folk-psychological concepts such as intention, belief, and volition (Morse, 2007). Attempts to integrate these folk-psychological concepts with cognitive scientific conceptions of the mind often generate concerns that insights from cognitive science will revise ordinary conceptions of the mind to the point that they become unrecognizable from the folk-psychological framework presupposed by criminal law. These concerns are especially pronounced when it comes to eliminativist views of propositional attitudes, as such attitudes form a core component of responsible agency as conceived by criminal law (Sifferd, 2018). As a result, attempts to revise legal responsibility doctrines in light of subpersonal findings frequently encounter resistance. I argue that this attitude can be justified by adopting an autonomist stance. Specifically, within the legal domain, presupposing autonomism preserves the coherence of folk-psychological reasoning within criminal law while also helping to avoid unnecessary theoretical conflicts.
If we were to adopt a monist stance on the interface problem, we would have to either reject autonomism across the board—thereby threatening the conceptual foundations of criminal law—or accept it universally, which would be incompatible with cognitive scientific practice. Adopting inter-domain pluralism, on the other hand, avoids such theoretical tensions. Thus, the advantage of pluralism is that it allows for domain-relative solutions that preserve the integrity of individual domains.
However, a potential cost of adopting pluralism is that it seems to abandon one of the core aims of the philosophy of psychology and cognitive science—namely, the pursuit of a unified theory of the mind (e.g., Bermúdez, 2005). If this is true, then pluralism appears problematic because it resists theoretical unification.
In response, I argue that the feasibility of this unification project is itself unclear. Recent scholarship suggests that the concept of “mind” is deployed in diverse and sometimes incompatible ways across different areas of the philosophy of cognitive science (see Gough, 2024). Given this, and considering that the personal/subpersonal distinction is fundamentally tied to different conceptions of the mind, expecting a single solution to the interface problem may be misguided from the outset. Thus, abandoning the pursuit of unity might not be as significant a theoretical cost as it initially appears.
Another pressing concern is whether inter-domain pluralism itself gives rise to new interface problems when different fields interact. For instance, if criminal law operates under an autonomist framework while cognitive science does not, how should the law incorporate scientific findings about the mind when they become relevant to issues such as ascriptions of criminal responsibility? Wouldn’t this lead to contradictions, particularly when subpersonal explanations challenge folk-psychological attributions of responsibility?
A tentative response is that, within legal contexts, autonomism does not necessarily exclude subpersonal explanations—it simply restricts their relevance. In ordinary legal cases, folk-psychological reasoning suffices for determining responsibility (Morse, 2007). However, in exceptional cases—such as when an individual’s mental state is in question due to psychiatric conditions—subpersonal evidence may inform legal decision-making. This selective integration of subpersonal explanations does not undermine the general autonomist stance of criminal law but rather refines its application. Thus, while there remains a challenge in refining the pluralist framework to clarify when and how personal and subpersonal explanations should interact in inter-disciplinary contexts, I argue that adopting pluralism does not entirely sever domains but instead allows for a nuanced interaction between them.
BermĂşdez, J. L. (2005). Philosophy of psychology: A contemporary introduction. Routledge.
Drayson, Z. (2012). The uses and abuses of the personal/subpersonal distinction. Philosophical Perspectives, 26(1), 1–18. https://doi.org/10.1111/phpe.12014
Drayson, Z. (2024). Personal/subpersonal distinction. In M. C. Frank, A. Majid, & A. Alsmith (Eds.), Open Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science. MIT Press. https://doi.org/10.21428/e2759450.8593aeda
Gough, J. (2024). Mind and mental: Extended, pluralistic, eliminated. Synthese, 204(5), 146. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-024-04788-5
Morse, S. J. (2007). Determinism and the death of folk psychology: Two challenges to responsibility from neuroscience. Minnesota Journal of Law, Science & Technology, 9, 1–36.
Shea, N. (2018). Representation in cognitive science. Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198812883.001.0001
Sifferd, K. L. (2018). Non-eliminative reductionism: Not the theory of mind some responsibility theorists want, but the one they need. In B. Donnelly-Lazarov (Ed.), Neurolaw and responsibility for action: Concepts, crimes, and courts (pp. 71–103). Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108553339.004