Joshua Shepherd
Affiliation: ICREA/Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona
Category: Philosophy
Keywords: cognitive flexibility, creativity, divergent thinking, broad attention, semantic memory, working memory updating
Date: Wednesday 3rd of September
Time: 15:00
Location: Room 232 (232)
View the full session: Creativity
Cognitive flexibility is widely claimed to support creativity.
It is said to be a âkey element of creativityâ (Palmiero et al. 2022, 359). Benedek et al. (2014) note that, by âgeneral consensus,â creativity ârequires flexibility of thoughtâ (75). It is required, many claim, because it âfacilitates the creation of novel and innovative ideasâ (Kenett et al. 2018, 867).
These kinds of claims are used to motivate a diverse set of experimental paradigms, and are used to justify the appearance of cognitive flexibility in leading scientific theories of creativity. So, for example, Nijstad et al.âs (2010) influential dual pathway model of creativity posits two interacting pathways to creative production, a flexibility pathway and a persistence pathway. Zabelinaâs Model of Creativity and Attention emphasizes a two-stage process in creative production, with cognitive flexibility at the core of one stage: âwhat may define creative people is their propensity to flexibly shift between goals or ideas, as well as the ability to regulate their thoughts and behaviorsâ (Zabelina et al. 2019, 47). And a recent high-profile review claims that cognitive flexibility relates to creativity in facilitating âassociative processes relevant to creativityâ (Beaty and Kenett 2023, 672). Reading such claims, it is natural to think that the science of creativity has discovered that cognitive flexibility supports or facilitates creativity (i.e., the generation of creative products, ideas, or actions). Surprisingly, however, this is not the case (or so I will argue). Current evidence simply does not justify the claim that cognitive flexibility plays important causal roles in the production of creative items. How can this be true? And how might cognitive flexibility relate to creativity? The aim of this paper is to organize thinking surrounding the relationships between cognitive flexibility and creativity, to assess the evidence that we have regarding these relationships, and to push towards research that could enhance our understanding of these relationships. This aim is complicated by the fact that the term âcognitive flexibilityâ is used in many different ways across different experimental sub-fields. The nature of cognitive flexibility requires significant disambiguation. I begin, then, by discussing how to approach explanatory appeals to cognitive flexibility, given its definitional polyvalence (part 2). I also discuss how ways to understand its links to creativity, and I hone focus to a causal claim (part 3). I then discuss multiple definitions of cognitive flexibility â to do with a property of the cognitive system (4.1), with open-mindedness (4.2), with broadened attention (4.3), with divergent thinking processes (4.4), with semantic memory structure (4.5), and with working memory and task switching (4.6). Along the way, I argue that current evidence does not support the claim that cognitive flexibility plays important causal roles in the production of creative items. However, definitions of cognitive flexibility to do with the operation of working memory signal promising avenues for future research, and I articulate these.